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**"Distance Matters: Place, Political Legitimacy and
Popular Support for European Integration"**

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Distance Matters: Place, Political Legitimacy and Popular Support for European Integration

Abstract

Theorists of globalization assume that technology has eclipsed distance as a sociologically and political significant variable. This article relies on insights obtained from the literatures on the regionalist revival and local democracy that we group under the label *localism* and on experimental results on the relationship between distance and emotional involvement. Based on these insights, we develop a series of hypotheses concerning the role of geographical distance in explaining support for the polity to which one belongs, which we then test with *Eurobarometer* data relative to support for the European Union. The results confirm the article's hypothesis and open new perspectives on the constraints faced by a geographically expanding European Union.

I. The “Eclipse of Distance”?

Popular media and academic analysis have converged in their conviction that *distance* embodied in the physical, cultural and territorial specificities of space has lost much of its salience. The speed of the Internet, the sweep and pace of economic interconnectedness, the increase in the movement and migration of peoples, and the emergence of supra-national forms of political organization – all of these support the conviction that the “territorial age has passed” (Maier 2000). This claim is not entirely new. In 1976, sociologist Daniel Bell coined the term “eclipse of distance” to argue that both modern aesthetics and psychology privileged the flexible mind over the rooted physical body, a-temporality over linear reality. In retrospect, Bell’s arguments appear surprisingly prescient. The theoretical assumption as well as the perception of the “eclipse of distance” that Bell observed in aesthetics and psychology is axiomatic to a broad number of claims that analysts of all stripes now label as globalization (see for example, Kellner 2002; Guillen 2001; Fiss and Hirsch 2005).

The compression of space and time that geographer David Harvey (1989) identified as characteristic of post-modernity was constitutive of early versions of globalization theory. The assumption that sociological categories such as scale and propinquity were obsolete as analytic categories was implicit to the idea of space/time compression.² Regional de-industrialization and ethno-national conflict, however,

² In general, propinquity was the object of interest among sociologists who studied mate selection, migration and discrimination. As a sociological concept, propinquity captured micro level processes of individual choice. Calhoun (1998) analyzes propinquity with respect to politics and provides a recent summary of the term.

challenge the utopian vision of market efficiency and cultural unity that this a-spatial approach to globalization presupposed. Recently, sociologists (Gieryn 2000; Griswold and Wright 2004; Lamont and Molnar 2002), historians (Applegate 1999; Sewell 2001; Gerson 2003), philosophers (Casey 1997), geographers and urban scholars (Entrikin 1991; Le Gales and Harding 1998; Agnew 1987) have begun to question the degradation of “place” implicit in much globalization discourse, and to turn to issues of propinquity and scale when talking about economic and political innovation and development (Brenner 1999). This new interest in place provides a corrective to some of the more sweeping claims of globalization theory. Place studies are a first step towards overcoming a persistent problem in the globalization literature--the absence of actors, as both agents and subjects of globalization. Globalization is often portrayed as agent-less – that is, an ineluctable machine driven by new forms of technology and the expansion of financial markets. Apart from case studies on anti-globalization movements (Ancelevici 2002; Wieviorka 2003; Tarrow 2005), research on how individuals and populations perceive and experience globalization is unfortunately sparse.³

Given the structural cast of the claims of globalization theory, it is difficult to assess how ordinary persons perceive the large-scale economic, social and cultural change that it describes. In brief, if the world has become global, does the average citizen feel and behave in a global way? In particular, does he or she experience the “eclipse of distance” and the degradation of place?

³ Anthropologists, following Appadurai’s seminal work (1996), are in the lead. See also the essays in Burawoy et. al. *Global Ethnography* (2000).

To address this question, this paper focuses on the case of European integration, the economic and political project that began in 1951 with the Economic Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and gained momentum in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty. Begun as a post World War II peace and economic reconstruction project among European nation-states, European integration has evolved into a more encompassing political and cultural project that systematically privileges Europe as a single geographical space. On May 1, 2004, the European Union added 8 nation-states from the former Eastern bloc as well as Cyprus and Malta. On October 3, 2005, membership negotiations began with Turkey in the context of debate on whether Turkey is really part of Europe. The continuing eastward expansion of the European Union is symptomatic of its “continental drift.”

Europeanization (Borneman and Fowler 1997; Schmitter 2001), the term that includes the expanding and sometimes contested process of political and cultural integration, subsumes many of the same issues as globalization—market convergence; cultural homogenization; supranational polities. More clearly so than globalization, however, European integration is agent-driven. States, elites, and citizens are identifiable agents in the process of European integration. The decision to join Europe and the degree of integration, that is, the acceptance of particular European projects, are often subject to political referenda within individual nation-states (Hug and Sciarini 2000). These referenda have covered issues such as the ratification of the various EU treaties, the decision to join the European Monetary Union, and the approval of the EU Constitution. Moreover, every five years European Union citizens are called upon to elect representatives to the European Parliament. Europe as a political project offers

citizens of individual European nation-states a menu of choices from which to shape national visions of a continental Europe. With respect to European integration, popular sovereignty determines the limits and dimensions of national sovereignty and structural change.⁴

This article uses *Eurobarometer* survey data collected in 2004 (*Eurobarometer* 62.0) to study the effect of distance, as measured by the approximate number of kilometers that the respondent lives from Brussels, on popular support for membership in the European Union and transfers of sovereignty to European Union institutions. We focus on distance for *four* reasons: first, physical location is inescapable—individuals must live somewhere; second, it allows us to develop a quantifiable measure of place that, in contrast to purely ethnographic accounts, permits us to generalize to other venues; third, distance involves a perception as well as a physical location—making it subject to issues of political legitimacy; and fourth, as the European Union expands, questions related to size and political organization (e.g. intergovernmentalism vs. federalism) have become central in the political debate on European integration. Through representative public opinion data one can systematically examine the link between distance and support

⁴ Abstention rates are consistently high for European Parliament elections. In the June 2004 elections, the abstention rate was 45.3% across Europe, and about 60% in the former Eastern Europe. Abstention rates are low with respect to national referenda on issues that relate to the degree of further engagement in the integration process. A recent example is the Swedish referenda on the euro where 56.1% of the population voted against joining the EMU (see Birch, forthcoming).

of European integration and thus throw light on the relevance of geography in this global age.

Our main hypothesis is that proximity to the European Union's symbolic and political center is positively related to support of European integration and that this effect is mediated by concerns over national identity, identification with Europe, trust towards European institutions, and confidence in the ability to influence European Union affairs.

This article proceeds in four stages: first, it summarizes standard approaches to the study of European integration and presents an alternative approach that incorporates issues of geography; second, it operationalizes these issues in terms of a testable model; third, it describes our findings; and lastly, it discusses these findings in the context of Europeanization specifically and globalization more generally.

II. European Integration Through the Lens of Globalization

A central claim of the literature on globalization is that technological progress in communications and transportation (the reason why we have cyber-markets), and the subsequent lowering of transaction costs associated with both, have made place and the geographic distances between places quasi-irrelevant for the organization of economic activity, political rule and contact between people.

Globalization theory generates three secondary claims that are salient in the context of European integration: first, neo-liberalism is the most appropriate ideology and practice for this global era; second, cultural homogenization is inevitable; and third, the political sphere is becoming increasingly post-national (trans-nationalism being a variant of this). Viewing European integration through the lens of globalization translates these claims as follows: first, neo-liberalism with its commitment to competition and

shareholder culture will provide greater economic opportunities for European citizens than the corporatist economies of the old social European State; second, as European integration moves forward, cultural homogenization will develop at the European level; and third, national as well as sub-national identities will decline in relevance. In short, *if* this logic holds, *interest* and *culture* will push public opinion in the direction of support for European integration at all levels.

Institutional studies of European integration as well as explanations of popular support for European integration roughly divide along the lines of the *emphasis* that they place upon *interest* or *culture*.⁵

Interest-based Approaches to European Integration

Interest as a concept captures the micro level of individual behavior as well as the macro level of institutional design (Swedberg 2005). The conceptual plasticity of interest as an analytic category enables it to capture a broad range of empirical research. Interest has governed institutional approaches to European integration (see for example, Moravscik 1998, Weiler 1999; Stone Sweet 2004). *Interest-driven* institutional approaches conclude that contemporary realities demand a re-ordering of norms, and rules of behavior, as well as the building of new and the re-framing of old institutions (for example Fligstein and Stone Sweet 2002; Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996). Focusing on multi-level governance, they posit new forms of state and market society alliances. Slaughter's (2004) "new world order" is based on her conception of the "disaggregated

⁵ Hooghe and Marks (2004) summarize this literature in terms of rationality and identity—terms that only partially capture the range of processes that they seek to describe.

state.” *Interest-driven* institutionalists view Europe as an opportunity space for new forms of governance and the re-organization of markets. In sum, similar to globalization theory, this approach to European integration views the decline of the modern nation-state as inevitable. Meanwhile, *interest-driven* approaches to support for European integration argue that individuals align their attitudes to the European Union with their expectations about how it will impact economically on them (see Hewstone 1986; Gabel 1998b).

Structural (Mann 1997; Evans 1997; Weiss 1998; essays in Paul, Ikenberry and Hall 2003) and cultural arguments (Joppke 1998) have countered the institutionalists’ focus on the inevitable passing away of the nation-state. Indeed, the emergence of neo-nationalist movements such as the French National Front, the Austrian resistance to the expansion of the Union in the direction of Central and Eastern Europe, and the development of anti-globalization movements such as ATTAC suggest indeed that the citizens of individual European nation-states do not uniformly view the European Union as an opportunity space (Berezin 2003). In addition, ethnographic work has challenged the assumptions about economic rationality and behavior that govern the *interest-driven* approach to support for European integration. Díez Medrano’s research (2003) has demonstrated that citizens neither seek nor use economic information when judging the merits and disadvantages of European integration. Some of Díez Medrano’s research subjects, all citizens of European nation-states, subverted standard rational choice assumptions when they admitted that their assessments of the economic impact of European integration followed, rather than preceded, their attitudes towards Europe.

Cultural Approaches to European Integration

In contrast to *interest-based* models of European integration, *cultural* approaches focus on the territorially bounded nation-state as the site of public political identities. Cultural analysts tend to focus on Europeanization rather than European integration. Two different perspectives appear in the literature on the process and consequences of Europeanization: *cultural homogenisation* and *post-nationalism*. The *cultural homogenisation* perspective views identity claims as increasingly transcending the boundaries of the nation-state. *Cultural homogenization* is evaluated differently by different authors, however. Some view it as oppressive, as Gramsci (1978, pp. 277-318) argued in his classic discussion of Americanization in Europe during the early years of the 20th century. More recent work speaks to the circulation of cultural products and practices around the globe—what Appadurai (1996) labels a “global ethnoscope.” John Meyer and his students have developed a world polity approach that focuses on the diffusion of innovations and on convergence as a model of social and political change (Meyer et.al. 1997).

If *cultural homogenisation* exists, and this is an empirical as well as an analytic claim, identities should become more and more homogeneous; or, to put it simply, people should become more and more like each other and see themselves as belonging to the same “imagined community (Anderson [1983] 1991).” The logic behind *cultural homogenisation* suggests that European integration in the culture sphere should be unproblematic (Laitin 1997). Survey evidence casts doubt on this prediction. While one can speak of a fairly homogeneous political culture within the European Union, as measured, for instance, by the *World Values Study* (Inglehart, 1997), the increase in the

degree of identification with Europe among its citizens has not been commensurate with *cultural homogeneity* and with progress in institution-building at the European Union level. Furthermore, recent research demonstrates that there is variation in the extent to which citizens from different EU countries perceive European cultures as similar. This variation plays a major role in the explanation of national contrasts in support for European integration (Diez Medrano 2003; Hooghe and Marks 2004).

The *post-national* perspective, a variant of the *cultural homogenisation* perspective, argues that nation-states are no longer a locus of authority and that there can be a disjunction between the polity in which you reside and the polity to which you have a legal claim (for example, Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996).⁶ In contrast to the post-national position that posits a radical disjuncture between national law and the claims of culture, “transnationalism” argues for a recognition of the need for the nation-state to remain the addressee of the identity claims of various sorts raised by non-nationals (Kastoryano 2002; Koopmans and Statham 1999). Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) have recently offered a thorough critique and rethinking of transnationalism from a nation-statist approach.

Limits to Interest-based and Cultural Approaches to European Integration

Interest-based and *cultural* approaches capture *some* but not *all* dimensions of the social processes that govern popular support for European integration. They do not capture the frequency with which citizens justify their opposition to European integration by using arguments about distance. Ethnographic work conducted in the late 1990s (Diez Medrano 2003) shows that ordinary citizens often invoke distance to justify their views

⁶ Tambini (2001) summarizes recent challenges to the post-national position.

on the European Union and European integration. Citations from this research suggest the tenor of their views.⁷ A young woman living in a Castilian city volunteered:

I am generally mistrustful, because when I see what happens here in Spain, where the state does whatever it wants and does not even care about the people's preferences, it is clear that moving to a yet wider level of governance...I mean, if people here become corrupt after only two years [*in government*], *imagine there*.

A Conservative Party city council member in an English town argued:

I mean, it is far better to devolve down decision making than devolve it all the way up...It's just, you know, the *distance* between the ordinary people and the government. *It is just too far*.

Influenced by the rhetoric and logics of globalization theory and research, *interest-based* and *cultural* approaches to Europe share the assumption that *place* or *geographic* location is not relevant to political identity and behavior. Despite the fact that European integration is a geographic as well as a political process (Katzenstein 2005; Berezin and Schain 2003), the voluminous technical literature devoted to indices of public support for European integration pays virtually no attention to the effect of geography.⁸

⁷ We wish to thank Juan Diez Medrano for permitting us to read and cite from transcripts from his ethnographic work.

⁸ Gabel's work (1998b) that operationalizes geography as a control variable is an exception to the neglect of geography. He measures whether or not survey respondents

III. Spatial Approaches to European Integration: Place, Perception and Affect

Since the 1980s, research on social and political developments in Europe has explicitly and implicitly demonstrated the continuing relevance of geography in a global world.⁹ *Localism* as a label captures the diverse strands of this research. *Localists* emphasize the various interrelated forces that have increased the salience of region (and smaller spatial units) as the locus of political and economic organization. The following sections treat geographical place, perception and affect as analytically distinct although they are inseparable empirically.

Localism and Place

Research in the *localist* tradition includes work on ethno-regional mobilization, new social movements, urban studies, and local democracy (Keating, 1998; Brenner, 1999). Each of these *four* strands of *localism* has a geographical or spatial component.

The literature on ethno-regional mobilization and new social movements has developed explanations for the emergence of social and political ethno-regional movements. Since the mid 1970s, these movements have put forward identity claims to justify their demands for administrative and/or political autonomy/independence. This literature suggests that citizens, “helped” by regionalist/nationalist organizations and local intellectuals, have rediscovered sub-national identities and aspire to achieve

live in a border region so as to assess the role that regional location played in support for European integration.

⁹ Agnew’s work (1987; 2002) has set the agenda in this area.

congruence between political/administrative boundaries and these sub-national identities (see Agnew, 1987; Keating, 1998; DeVries 2000).

The citizens' propensity to trust distant government has decreased rather than increased as globalization has broadened the geographic scope of economic activity and brought an ever growing number of cultures in contact with each other. Since most surveys point to the population's tendency to identify more with the local than with broader territorial units, this political trend constitutes a barrier to the development of support for large multi-national polities such as the European Union.

The literature on local democracy and governance supports, or claims the existence of popular support for, local governance. At the normative and policy-oriented levels, advocates of local democracy harness arguments to demonstrate the superiority of local/regional forms of governance over less local ones. These arguments emphasize the more democratic character (following Aristotle, Tocqueville, and Mill among others) or greater economic efficiency, or both, of sub-national forms of governance (Weir and Beetham, 1999; Swianiewicz, 2001).¹⁰

Studies that move away from normative concerns to simply explore citizens' preferences for different forms of government emphasize that the citizens' involvement in the political process increases as the administrative-political units become smaller (Jamil 1991; Mouritzen 1991). Authors in this tradition also propose that citizens generally find political elites who live close to the area over which they rule to be better

¹⁰ For a critical examination of the thesis that local autonomy necessarily means more democracy, see Pratchett (1999).

informed about a community's problems, more trustworthy, and easier to access (Mouritzen 1991; Weir and Beetham 1999).¹¹.

Research on identity movements and on local democracy speaks to issues of geography in indirect and important ways. The arguments that analysts use to explain and/or justify the recent proliferation of movements for local autonomy and democracy can guide us in identifying mechanisms that might impact upon the relation between geographical distance and support for European integration. Advocates of local autonomy, that is independence from a national state, enumerate singly or in combination five factors that influence their claims that given the proper conditions transpose into causal mechanisms. These factors are: first, degree of information about local conditions; second, concern for the problems and interests of people residing in particular regions; third, accountability of politicians to local constituencies; fourth, accessibility of political elites; and fifth, degree of identification with the polity.

The *localist* approach suggests that support for a polity *decreases* as one moves away from the polity's center. Citizen concern over the five factors outlined provides a cogent reason to expect geographical distance to impact on the citizens' degree of support for their polity. If citizens want autonomy and local democracy because they believe that locally elected and governing elites are likely to be members of the same ethno-cultural group, more informed, more concerned with local problems, more accountable, and more

¹¹ The jury is still out on this claim as some empirical results suggest a more complex relationship between proximity and legitimacy of rule. Larsen (2002), for instance, finds that Danes who live closer to their local rulers participate more in the political process but do not necessarily find rulers more efficient or trustworthy.

accessible to the citizens, then we would expect to observe that their support for the polity to which they belong decreases as the distance from where they live and where the central government is located increases.

Cognition, Resonance and Emotion

For all its merits in demonstrating the persistent role of place and distance in a global age, the *localist* perspective alone does not make transparent what makes citizens' beliefs about the virtues of local autonomy and democracy so powerful. Localism as an analytic category leaves unanswered a series of "why" questions. Why do citizens trust local government more than government from more distant locations? Why do citizens find social movements that emphasize local identities and the virtues of local government attractive? Why are ethno-national and regional movements emphatically critical of the geographical distance that separates the rulers from the subjects of rule? In short, *localism* does not tell us about the underlying emotional basis for the political significance of distance.

To understand how geographic locales affect political processes such as support for European integration, we must theorize a relation between perception and physical space, i.e., distance. In this article we emphasize the role of perceptual frames. We claim that political frames sometimes get their strength from the fact that they resonate with deeply anchored perceptual frames, in turn associated to strong emotions. Indeed, people in all cultures link size, volume, texture, distance, color, height, flavor, and so on, to specific social qualities, which reflects the influence of perceptions and connected emotions. Based on our belief that perceptual framing processes significantly shape people's attitudes toward objects and problems, and taking our cue from the re-

emergence of social science interest in physical space, we bring in geography by focusing on distance in our analysis of public support for European integration. We argue that in the context of deep uncertainty and insecurity created by globalization, arguments about the virtues of local autonomy and government persuade so many people because they resonate with negative perceptions and emotions connected with distance (Schudson, 1989). Distance as a concept unites cognition (Di Maggio 1997), and spatial arrangements or place (Entrikin 1991). Thus, distance is a relevant frame for the study of political legitimacy.

Figure 1 About Here

The theoretical expectation that distance matters for perceptions of political legitimacy gains plausibility when one reviews experimental research conducted since the 1950s on the relationship between distance and emotions. This early research provides critical information on the functional form of this relationship. In 1965, Ekman and Bratfisch proposed that emotional involvement declines with distance and then went on to argue that the functional relationship between the two is nonlinear. They called this functional relationship the inverse square root law, which can be mathematically expressed as $EI = SD^{-0.5}$. The law implies that emotional involvement decreases as distance from a point increases and that the rate of decreasing emotional involvement becomes smaller as distance increases. In other words, beyond a certain distance, continuing reductions in emotional involvement tend to become negligible.¹²

¹² Ekman and Bratfisch's article led to a debate in the 1960s and 1970s, which validated their findings (Stanley 1968, Stanley 1971, Lundberg, Bratfisch, and Ekman,

Governing Hypothesis

Our discussion of the strengths and limitations of the various conceptual approaches to the study of contemporary Europeanization suggests that distance might be a significant factor in explaining variation in public support and emotional engagement in the ongoing project of European integration.

This hypothesis is formally stated as follows:

The further an individual lives from the center of power (symbolic or real) the less likely they are to support membership in the polity and transfers of sovereignty to that center. In other words, we expect a negative relation between distance from Brussels, the symbolic and real center of the European integration project and support for membership in the European Union.

IV. Brussels: The Center of Europe

In order to evaluate the relationship between geographic distance and support for membership in the European Union, one first needs to determine where the European Union's political and symbolic center lies. In democratic state-like polities (and the European Union is no exception) ruling elites and civil servants are recruited throughout the polity's territory, and laws and policies are implemented equally throughout the politically-defined territory. Furthermore, the polity's civil servants and administrators reside and perform their duties in the different parts of this territory. Members of polities identify with specific geographic locations within these polities.

1972, Walmsley 1974, and Strzalecki, 1978; see also Walmsley and Lewis, 1993 and Carbon, 1998).

The establishment of permanent capital cities, which generally but not always coincided with the consolidation of modern national states, provided the cultural frame for modern political authority and identification.¹³ As Geertz (1983) argues: “Thrones may be out of fashion, and pageantry too; but political authority still requires a cultural frame in which to define itself and advance its claims. . . . (143).” Paris, for instance, was always the capital of the expanding polities that eventually became France; London became England’s capital early in the 11th century, with Elizabeth I’s reign (1558-1603) marking the apogee of the city’s domination of England (Nightingale 1987); Rome became the capital of unified Italy in 1870; Madrid became Spain’s capital in 1607, under King Phillip II; Berlin became Germany’s capital with German unification in 1871, ceased being so after Germany’s partition following WWII, and regained its capital status in 1990, just after German re-unification.

Two other factors that have contributed to the mental identification of some states with their capital city are first, that these states have highly centralized administrations; and second, that significant conflicts have occurred between these administrations and certain social groups and/or populations that are distant from capital cities. More generally, state-building efforts since the 17th century and nation-building ones since the 19th century have included the rulers’ transformation and use of capital cities for symbolic purposes. As Mukerji (1997) demonstrated, urbanization projects at the center of the realm became miniature representations of the power and spirit that animated state and nation-building projects. The capital city also became the preferred site for the

¹³ Le Gales (2002, pp. 31-72) provides a compact political history of the development of European cities.

staging of highly visible state rituals. In this sense, the capital city came to play a similar symbolic role as the anthem and the flag in people's imagination.

Resulting from the perceived role of capital cities as the geographic center of power, rulers have often been sensitive to the strategic costs and benefits of choosing one city or another as their capital. In Spain, for instance, it was often debated whether Barcelona should become the state's capital in order to ensure the Catalans' loyalty to Spain. In Germany, after re-unification, moving the capital city from Bonn to Berlin was thought to have implications for Germany's relations with Western, Central, and Eastern Europe. In sum, citizens over the last few centuries have learned to imagine the state as a territorially bounded space, with power concentrated in its capital city. External borders and capital cities have thus become equally important in the citizens' territorial visualization of the state (Mamadough, 2001).

The European Union offers an unusual opportunity to explore how place or geographic location impacts upon the collective assessment of political legitimacy. Brussels is the *de facto* and symbolic center of power within the European Union as its main institutions and officials are located there.¹⁴ The European Commission headquarters and the Secretariat of the European Parliament are in Brussels. Diplomatic representatives accredited to the European Union reside in Brussels. Brussels as a center of power is unusual because, in contrast to other capital cities, there is a clear differentiation between the European Union administration and national administrations; and, secondly, most of the European Union's officials are nationals from countries other

¹⁴ Papadopoulos (1996) provides the history of the development of the EU buildings within Brussels.

than one's own. Most importantly, when people refer to statements and decisions made by the European Union they often use expressions such as "Brussels says..." or "Brussels does..." Also, it is the city which citizens use as reference point when criticizing the European Union for being "too far" from where these citizens reside.

Voices from the ethnographic research cited earlier in this article (Diez Medrano transcripts) underscore the importance of Brussels as a symbolic center. A member of a National Farmers' Union in a small Scottish town observes:

I think, it's very easy for people to sit in Brussels, and comment upon farming here, and the way the farming should be done, but you know, a farm in Scotland is totally different from a farm in Southern Spain or whatever.

The main editor of a local newspaper in Scotland argues:

You hear people complaining that people in Brussels don't know what they're doing, they waste money, they don't really understand what people here want.....after all these years there is still a negative view, among quite a few people I would think, that this is none of your business, you know, that Brussels is an interfering force, interferes in this country.

VI. Data and Methods

The statistical analysis below tests the hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between geographical distance from Brussels and support for membership in

the European Union. Furthermore, it examines the extent to which the causal mechanisms invoked in our discussion of *localism* mediate the relationship between distance and the European Union. The analysis uses *Eurobarometer* survey data collected in the Fall of 2004 in the 25 European Union member states (*Eurobarometer 62.0*). It is the first such *Eurobarometer* to include the 10 new EU members, following their accession in the Spring of 2004.

Dependent Variables

We examine the impact of geographical distance on attitudes toward European integration through *two* dependent variables. The *first* one measures whether respondents feel that they would regret a hypothetical dissolution of the European Union. It is a measure of affect for the European Union as a political community. The question which respondents had to answer reads as follows:

If you were told tomorrow that the European Union had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent, or very relieved?

The *second* indicator measures the respondents' degree of satisfaction with membership in the European Union. It is the most frequently used measure of support for the European Union (Gabel 1998a; Gabel 1998b; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993) and can be treated as the positive formulation of the first item described above. The question that respondents had to answer reads as follows:

Generally speaking, do you think that [Country's] membership of the European Union is/would be ...? 1. A good thing, 2. A bad thing, 3. Neither good nor bad.

The body of the text focuses on the statistical results based on the first item and the *Appendix* includes the statistical results obtained with the second question. There is a good reason for us privileging the first item. To say that one would regret it if the European Union were to dissolve reflects a stronger degree of attachment to it than to say that membership in the European Union is a good thing (especially if one's country is already part of the European Union). Although the two items are highly correlated ($\text{Eta}=0.63$), the distribution of both variables reflects that the former better distinguishes supporters from sceptics. The traditional measure of support is indeed highly skewed, with 62% of the respondents saying that they find membership in the European Union "a good thing". Meanwhile, the percentage of respondents saying that they would regret the dissolution of the European Union is only 46%. From a statistical viewpoint, a categorical variable without skew is preferable to a highly skewed one.

Distance

The main independent variable in the analysis measures how far respondents live from Brussels. To assign values to respondents for this variable we use information on the region where respondents live¹⁵. On the average, respondents were located 1011 km

¹⁵ We use NUK 2 regions as defined by *Eurostat*, for all countries. To determine the distance between each region and Brussels, we drew concentric circles on a map of Europe, each of them 100 km wider than the previous one, until the circles encompassed all regions in the European Union. We assigned to each respondent the mean distance corresponding to the circle in which the region of residence fell. When a region encompassed several circles, we used the distance corresponding to the average of the mean distance for each circle. For the Canary Islands, the Azores Islands, and Madeira,

away from Brussels, with a standard deviation equal to 620 km. The variable “distance” is conceived as an individual-level property. Distance affects individuals’ support of European integration by impacting on their emotional involvement with the European Union, on the extent to which they trust European Union bureaucrats, and on their perceptions of how removed European Union bureaucrats are from local problems.

Figure 2: Map About Here

In the statistical analysis, we operationalize distance in two different ways. First, we use dummy variables corresponding to ten distance intervals. Then, based on the results of the former models, we use the logarithm of distance in more complex ones. A negative coefficient for the effect of this variable on the dependent variables indicates that the farther away from Brussels that the respondents lived, the less they would regret the dissolution of the European Union. Our test of the impact of geographical variables also includes a variable measuring whether respondents live in the region defined by their country’s capital city or not and another variable measuring the level of urbanization where respondents live. This second variable distinguishes among respondents who live in small towns/rural areas, in middle size towns, and in large towns/cities. We expect residents in urban areas and in the capital city to feel more attached to the European Union than do those who live elsewhere.

Intermediate Variables between Distance and Support for European Integration

The discussion in the theoretical section above predicts the following mechanisms as mediating the hypothesized relation between distance and support of the European

the assigned value corresponds to the distance from Brussels to the main island in each group of islands.

Union: 1) greater fears of losing one's national identity as distance from the cultural core increases, 2) decreasing emotional attachment to the European Union as distance from the European Union's capital increases, 3) declining trust in the competence of European Union officials to understand local problems as distance from Brussels increases, and 4) increasing perception that one cannot impact on European policy-making as distance from the European Union's capital increases.

To test for the impact of these different mechanisms, the statistical analysis below uses five independent variables, each tapping on one of the four mechanisms just listed.

The first item reflects the respondents' answers to the following question:

Some people may have fears about the building of Europe, the European Union. Here is a list of things which some people say they are afraid of. For each one, please tell me if you—personally—are currently afraid of it, or not?

The second item reflects the respondents' answers to the following question:

People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please let me know how attached you feel to...Europe.

The third item measures the respondents' level of trust in the European Union. The questionnaire item read as follows:

I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in the following institutions. Please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it...The European Union.

Finally, to measure the respondents' perceived influence in European Union affairs, we rely on the answers to two similarly worded questions:

Please tell me for each statement whether you tend to agree
or tend to disagree?

-My voice counts in the European Union.

-(Our country's) voice counts in the European Union.

Control Variables

As the voluminous literature on European integration suggests, individual support for the European Union results from the interplay of multiple forces. Some of these variables correspond to the *interest-based* approach outlined above; others correspond to the *cultural* approach. In general, one would expect many of these variables to be correlated with the distance between the place where people live and Brussels. We thus do not have reason to expect a gross effect of distance in the predicted direction. What we predict, however, is that after holding other variables constant, distance will emerge as a variable impacting on support for the European Union. We thus examine the relationship between distance and support for the European Union, holding constant as many variables among those that prior studies have found relevant.

Interest Variables

The statistical analysis controls for two contextual factors highlighted in the literature that may impact on people's attitudes to the European Union and are correlated with distance. The *first* variable measures the degree of EU-trade dependence in the country where respondents live. The data correspond to 2004 and have been published by *Eurostat*. Earlier studies have shown that support of the European Union increases

with the level of EU-trade dependence, as measured by the share of total trade a country conducts with the European Union (e.g. Eichenberg and Dalton 1993).

The second contextual variable measures the net budget balance between EU member states and the European Union, per inhabitant. The data are for 2003 (European Commission services). We would expect that net-receivers from the European Union will display more positive attitudes toward the European Union than those that are net payers. Among the former one finds the main beneficiaries of European Union financial support during the last decade, which are Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. In the last fifteen years, Ireland moved from being one of the poorest countries in the European Union to becoming one of the richest. Testifying to the role of the European Union structural funds in increasing the European Union's legitimacy, Ireland also moved in the same period from being one of the most Eurosceptical countries to becoming one of the most Europhile ones. The new EU members have been coded 0 on this variable, since at the time of the survey a decision had not yet been made on how much they would contribute and receive from the European Union. There is therefore only a small correlation between net budget transfers and GDP/capita, another variable that we included in statistical analyses not included here but which had no impact on support for the European Union.

In addition to the *contextual* variables listed above, the statistical analysis includes individual-level variables that control for variables traditionally used in the quantitative literature on support of European integration. Several dummy variables distinguish respondents based on their current or past (in the case of retirees) main occupation. Manual workers, farmers and the unemployed have traditionally been less supportive of

European integration than the rest of the population whereas professionals, managers, and businesspeople have traditionally been more supportive. The omitted category corresponds to white collar workers.

The literature on European integration has often emphasized that citizens use the economy's performance as proxy information about the European Union's beneficial impact. This is partly due to the fact that governments tend to blame the European Union for bad macroeconomic performance and take credit for good macroeconomic performance (Gabel and Whitten 1997). In order to control for this factor, the statistical analysis includes two traditional items used to assess the citizens' economic perceptions.

The wording for the first item is:

What are your expectations for the next twelve months?

Will the next twelve months be better, worse, or the same,
when it comes toyour personal job situation?

The wording for the second item is:

If you compare your personal situation with five years ago,
would you say that it has improved, stayed about the same,
or got worse?

In line with prior research, we expect respondents with positive perceptions to have a more positive attitude toward the European Union than have respondents with negative perceptions.

Cultural Variables

The statistical analysis includes some cultural variables in addition to those used to test for the causal mechanisms mediating the effect of distance on support for the European Union, as implied in the *localist* literature. One of these variables measures the respondents' level of education. Level of education is operationalized through a set of dummy variables. The *Eurobarometer* allows us to distinguish between respondents with less than high school education from those with only high school education and those with more than high school education. The literature has shown that more educated segments of the population tend to be more positively oriented toward European integration than are other population segments, mainly because of their more cosmopolitan experiences and views.

Together with the education variable, we include a measure of cognitive political mobilization traditionally included in empirical studies of European integration (Inglehart 1977; Jansen 1991). This variable reflects the respondents' answer to the following question:

When you get together with friends, would you say that
you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or
never?

The literature predicts a positive relationship between levels of cognitive political mobilization and support of European integration. In order to further assess, however, whether respondents use their cognitive skills to think about the European Union, we include a variable that measures the degree of knowledge respondents have of European

Union affairs in the statistical models. Respondents had to assess their level of knowledge on a scale from 0 to 10, based on the following question:

Using this scale, how much do you feel you know about the European Union, its policies, its institutions?

We expect respondents with more knowledge about the European Union to hold more positive views than those of respondents with less knowledge. Generally speaking, the lesser uncertainty with respect to the impact of the European Union on one's life created by increased knowledge should compensate for whatever negative information this knowledge may sometimes entail.

Traditional analyses of European integration (e.g. Gabel 1998b; Díez Medrano, 2003) have shown that supporters of bourgeois or moderate working class parties support European integration more than do supporters of far right or far left political parties. The *Eurobarometer 62.0* does not include a variable on the respondents' electoral preferences, but it does include an indicator of self-placement in a left-right (liberal-conservative) ideology scale. Our analysis includes several dummy variables representing the respondents' political views, with centrist views as the omitted variable. We expect respondents who describe themselves as close to the far right or the far left will be less supportive of the European Union than are respondents with more moderate political views.

We complement this political indicator with another one that reflects the degree to which respondents trust state political institutions. Inclusion of this variable is warranted in order to control for the effect of the variable that measures trust on the European Union, since all the institutions were part of the same battery of items. We would expect

respondents who do not trust their state institutions may have displaced their trust towards the European Union. This variable has been constructed by adding the number of state institutions that respondents claimed to trust. Justice/the legal system, the police, the army, political parties, the government, and the national parliament are the state institutions included in this list.

Additional Control Variables

Finally, the statistical analysis includes a set of variables that do not clearly fall within the *interest-based* or *cultural* approaches. First, we include a dummy variable to distinguish residents from Cyprus from the rest of the respondents. Cyprus is a very special case from a political point of view. The unsolved conflict between Greece and Turkey over the sovereignty of this small island located at the Eastern edge of the Mediterranean, coupled with the fact that only the Greek section of the island has become a member of the European Union, increases the stakes of EU membership for the population. We would thus expect very strong support for membership in the EU in Cyprus.

Another control variable included in the analysis is age, since we expect older respondents to be less supportive of European integration than are younger ones. Finally, we include gender in the models, although there is no *a priori* reason to believe that men's attitudes differ from women's. A descriptive summary of all the variables included is appended to the main text of this article (*Appendix 1*).

To test our hypotheses we have estimated multinomial logit models, using the statistical program *Stata 8.0*. In order to correct standard errors for clustering within countries, we have used the Huber/White correction.

VII. Findings

Table 1 presents the results of estimating various multinomial logit models to assess the effect of geographical distance on attitudes toward European Union membership. In order to simplify the presentation, we focus on the Regret/Relief variable of support for the European Union and on the two extreme categories. Table 1 displays only the coefficients for the dummy variables measuring distance (see Appendix for the remaining coefficients).

Table 1 About Here

Column 1 reports the effect of geographical distance before controlling for other variables. All the coefficients are negative but only the coefficients for the distances between 501 Km and 750 Km and between 1751 Km and 2000 Km are statistically significant. Column 2 reports the effect of geographical distance after controlling for the net budget balance per inhabitant between EU member states and the European Union. All coefficients for distance are negative and, except for distances above 2251 Km, they are all significant. Furthermore, the magnitude of the coefficients tends to increase as distance increases.

These results reveal that net budget transfers act as a suppressor of the relationship between distance and support for the European Union. Indeed, the greatest beneficiaries of EU transfers over the last decade have been countries located relatively far away from Brussels. One can imagine that this suppressor effect will become even greater when the 10 new members, which by Fall 2004 (barely four months after accession) were neither net recipients nor net payers (and have thus been coded as 0 on the net budget transfers variable), start to receive structural funds and become net

recipients. One reason why the coefficient for distances over 2251 Km is not statistically significant is that Cyprus lies in this interval. Once one includes the dummy variable for Cyprus, as in Column 3 of Table 1, the coefficient for distances above 2251 Km becomes negative and statistically significant.

Columns 4 to 6 sequentially add the trade variable, the individual-level control variables, and the individual-level variables that one would expect to mediate the relationship between distance and support for the European Union. The proportion of the explained variance increases with each consecutive model. The effect of distance remains statistically significant and declining support of the European Union continues as distance increases. Furthermore, as in all previous models, it seems that support decreases more rapidly at shorter distances (i.e. between 501 Km and 750 Km) than at longer ones. This is exactly what the experimental literature on the relationship between distance and emotional involvement predicts. The fit of the models increases as one introduces new variables and in the end the model in column 6 produces a very respectable pseudo R-square of 26% (with pseudo R-square= $1-L_1/L_0$).

In order to better assess the role of different control and independent variables in suppressing, increasing, or mediating the effect of distance on support for the European Union, we have thus re-estimated the models in Table 1 using a nonlinear transformation of distance that conforms to this functional relationship. The literature (Ekman and Bratfisch 1965) predicts that the most appropriate nonlinear transformation of distance is the inverse-square root function. Since the loglinear transformation, a very similar function, provides virtually identical statistical results but makes the statistical results

easier to interpret, we have preferred to report the statistical results of using this loglinear transformation. Table 2 displays the statistical results of this re-analysis.

Table 2 About Here

Column 1 in Table 2 shows the effect of distance, controlling for all variables except for the individual-level mechanisms that should mediate the relationship between distance and support of EU membership. The model is equivalent to the one estimated reported in Table 1, Column 5, except for the fact that we use the Ln of distance rather than ten dummy variables for distance. The effect for the Ln of distance is negative and statistically significant, which means that, holding the other variables in the model constant, the farther respondents live from Brussels the less they would regret a hypothetical dissolution of the European Union. The -0.56 logit coefficient means that the odds of regretting the dissolution of the European Union, holding other variables in the model constant, are 2.46, 3.63, and 8.94 times greater 50 km away from Brussels than 250 km, 500 km, and 2500 km away from Brussels respectively.

Our focus in this paper is not on the behavior of the other variables in the model. We thus limit ourselves to briefly describe the meaning of the various coefficients. Table 2 shows that, holding other variables constant, net budget recipient countries are more likely to say that they would feel sorry if the European Union were to dissolve than do other respondents. It also says that the higher a country's share of trade with the European Union, the greater the chances that respondents from these countries claim that they would experience regret were the European Union to dissolve.

Finally, the coefficients in Table 2 tell us that non-Cypriot, younger, relatively more educated, more politically inclined, better informed, and politically moderate

respondents, as well as respondents who evaluate positively their past and future economic prospects and those employed in the professions or as business executives, are more prone to say that they would regret the dissolution of the European Union than are other respondents.

In this section of the analysis we are especially interested in assessing the role of specific causal mechanisms in mediating the observed relationship between distance and support for the European Union. Columns 2 to 5 report the coefficients for variables that are used as indicators of these causal mechanisms, as they are introduced one by one in the statistical model. Column 2, for instance, confirms previous work on support for the European Union (i.e. Díez Medrano, 2003) in showing that respondents who fear for the erosion of their national identity as a result of European integration express less support for the European Union than do respondents who do not harbor these fears. Column 3 shows that attachment to Europe is positively related to support for the European Union. Column 4 shows that respondents who trust the European Union more tend to support the European Union more than do those respondents who do not trust the European Union. Finally, Column 5 shows that respondents who feel that they personally or their country have a voice in the European Union support the European Union more than do those who do not feel that they have a voice. All these results are consistent with theoretical predictions.

An important question we want to address by including the variables above in the analysis is whether they explain the impact of distance on support for the European Union, as the literature would predict. Columns 2 to Column 5 show that the only variables to intervene in the relationship between distance and support of the European

Union are the ones that measure whether respondents feel that they or their country have a voice on European Union affairs. When one introduces these variables in the model the coefficient for the logarithm of distance changes from -0.56 (Column 1) to -0.37 . This finding is consistent with the prediction that increasing distance erodes support for the European Union because respondents feel increasingly powerless with respect to European Union politics.

To address remaining concerns that the observed effect of distance may be spurious and capture either recent member status or some other unaccounted variables, we fitted an additional model that included a dummy variable to distinguish the ten new members from the remaining ones. The results of this analysis confirmed, however, the results discussed above. We did not find statistical evidence either showing that the effect of perceptions of having a voice in the European Union on support for the European Union depends on whether respondents belong to the old or the new members. We also estimated additional models with interaction terms. One of these models included a term for the interaction between residence in the capital city and distance. The other one included terms for the interaction between level of education and distance. None of them were statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Further, we estimated the models discussed above using ordinal logit analysis rather than multinomial logit models and obtained the same results. Finally, we replicated all the models discussed here using the traditional variable on support of membership in the European Union. The tables for these models, included in the Appendix, confirm the results reported above.¹⁶

¹⁶ We also fitted a multinomial logit and ordinal logit fixed effects model, with dummy variables representing the countries in the sample, which is arguably too conservative a

In sum, the statistical evidence collected for this article confirms previous statistical findings based on data for 1999 and for the old European Union members (see Díez Medrano 2003) and demonstrate that distance indeed matters in explaining support of EU membership. Whether we model the effect of distance with dummy variables or through a nonlinear transformation, we find that when one holds other variables constant, the further away people live from Brussels the less they support the European Union. Controlling for other factors people who live fairly close to Brussels are more supportive of EU membership than are those living further away. Also, the statistical findings suggest that the distance effect is only mediated by people's sense of efficacy in influencing European Union politics. Other variables, such as the citizens' fear of losing their national identity, the degree of identification with Europe, and mistrust of European Union officials do not seem to explain the negative effect of distance.

VIII. Distance Matters: Place and Political Legitimacy

In an analysis of the role of distance in foreign relations, Henrikson (2002) argues that globalization has increased the proportion of long distance relationships. This makes distance more relevant than ever, for, no matter how instantaneous long distance communication has become, the geographical space in between still impacts on these relationships. His is a claim for a decoupling of space and time when reflecting on how

model, for it estimates the net effect of distance holding all national characteristics constant, or what one could call a "pure" distance effect. The coefficient for $\ln(\text{distance})$ in the multinomial logit model (Regret vs. Relieved contrast) was negative and significant at 0.08 level and the coefficient for $\ln(\text{distance})$ in the ordinal logit model was negative and significant at the 0.05 level.

the actual distance separating two partners in a relationship impacts on the relationship. In fact, one can say that globalization has created a unique historical opportunity to actually decouple time and space and thus examine the real social significance of the latter.

This opportunity has been missed by many observers of globalization; by taking the metaphor of “time-space compression” literally, they have failed to notice that space is objectively still there. Space has not shrunk; only the time needed to get from point A to point B has shrunk. Space matters economically, as Harvey notes, because it provides the spatial fix thanks to which transactions overcome space (1985, p. 145). Distance matters sociologically, we argue, not only because it takes time to get there, but because our visualization, our perception, of the space in-between affects our emotions, our beliefs, our attitudes, and, eventually, our behavior. Furthermore, the *localist* literature we have reviewed above leads to the expectation that, if anything, globalization has strengthened the emotional and cognitive significance of distance by making citizens more distrustful of rule from afar. These insights on the role of distance have until now been lost by those conducting research on European integration in the *interest based* and *cultural* perspectives outlined above.

Of all the various relationships we examined, the relation between distance from Brussels and support for European integration was consistently salient even after controlling for other substantively important variables. We found that the further an individual lives from Brussels, the less likely he or she is to support European integration. We do not claim that distance is the most important factor impacting on political legitimacy. Under some special circumstances, however, like those prevailing in the

European Union (a multinational bureaucracy, distinct from national bureaucracies and located mainly in Brussels) the illusion that power is located in a particular place can be stronger and make geographical distance politically more relevant.

The special circumstances that make distance relevant in the EU are rarely given in other states around the world. States with territorially concentrated culturally-distinct groups, however, resemble in some respects the EU and we might expect distance to play a bigger role in political support in these states than in states where this circumstance is not present (e.g. the United States). This is because, like in the European Union, in multinational states it is easier for people to perceptually connect the city where government sits with the actual site of power—‘foreign’ power--than in ethnically homogeneous states or in multi-ethnic states where ethnic groups are not spatially segregated. Furthermore, the fact that, contrary to the EU, many of these multinational states formed through forced or illegitimate annexation of increasingly peripheral areas, makes this perception and the presence of a distance effect even more likely.

This article makes a distinctive contribution to the study of European integration by arguing that distance matters for political legitimacy. Place—the culturally and political bounded space in which individuals are rooted--is profoundly relevant to the project of institutional change. The results of the statistical analysis presented above have significant implications for the process of European integration. They show that distance matters and that it matters mainly because people who reside far from Brussels have a lower sense of political efficacy than do those who live close to Brussels.

The statistical results also show, however, that the European Union institutions have been successful in countering the negative effect of distance through redistributive

policies. Indeed, the negative effect of distance is not visible until one controls for net budgetary transfers. Countries that are far from Brussels, such as Spain, Portugal, and Greece count among the most Europhile ones in the European Union. Yet, as the analysis above suggests this is partly because they, together with another distant country, Ireland, are the countries that have benefited most from the European Union's structural funds. When one holds net budgetary transfers constant, the negative impact of geographic distance emerges quite clearly. This finding suggests that the negative impact of distance on support for European integration can be partly counteracted through economic incentives. From a policy perspective, this finding provides an additional rationale for providing generous financial support to new EU members as many of them are located quite far from the EU's center of political power and one cannot take their allegiance to the EU for granted.

Figure 1. Analytical Frame for Understanding Attitudes and Behavior




Table 1. The Effect of Distance (Distance Intervals) on Reactions to a Hypothetical Dissolution of the European Union, controlling for Contextual and Individual-level Socio-demographic and Political Culture Variables (Multinomial Results—Contrast: Regret/Relieved)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
250-500 Km	-1.08+ (0.51)	-1.37* (0.50)	-1.38* (0.50)	-0.95* (0.35)	-0.92+ (0.37)	-0.48 (0.33)
501-750 Km	-0.86* (0.27)	-1.18* (0.28)	-1.19* (0.28)	-1.05* (0.21)	-1.28* (0.36)	-1.01* (0.35)
751-1000 Km	-0.53 (0.43)	-1.17* (0.38)	-1.18* (0.38)	-1.13* (0.35)	-1.28* (0.42)	-1.30* (0.36)
1001-1250 Km	-0.42 (0.32)	-0.97* (0.35)	-0.98* (0.35)	-1.14* (0.27)	-1.00* (0.38)	-1.32* (0.43)
1251-1500 Km	-0.21 (0.44)	-1.06+ (0.43)	-1.08+ (0.43)	-1.05* (0.28)	-1.11* (0.36)	-1.28* (0.33)
1501-1750 Km	-0.63 (0.48)	-1.38* (0.44)	-1.40* (0.44)	-1.27* (0.24)	-1.67* (0.36)	-1.05* (0.31)
1751-2000 Km	-0.90+ (0.38)	-2.10* (0.35)	-2.11* (0.35)	-1.70* (0.31)	-2.23* (0.38)	-1.94* (0.24)
2001-2250 Km	-0.82 (0.80)	-2.26* (0.42)	-2.29* (0.42)	-1.80* (0.42)	-2.36* (0.55)	-1.73* (0.46)
2251-3250 Km	0.23 (0.32)	-0.36 (0.40)	-1.51* (0.35)	-1.16* (0.28)	-1.65* (0.47)	-1.75* (0.24)
Intercept 1: Very Sorry vs Relieved	1.81* (0.21)	2.26* (0.22)	2.27* (0.22)	-0.86 (1.39)	-4.48* (1.72)	-5.69* (1.46)
Intercept 2: Very Sorry vs Indifferent	-0.71+ (0.32)	1.55* (0.29)	1.56* (0.30)	-1.27 (0.89)	-0.99 (1.01)	-1.03 (0.86)
McFadden	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.12	0.26
-2LL	-13219.269	-13045.654	-13040.654	-12984.388	-11795.503	-9872.4003
Df	18	20	22	24	76	90
N=13545						

Model Description

1. Distance
 2. Distance and Net Budget Balance
 3. Distance, Net Budget Balance, and Cyprus
 4. Distance, Net Budget Balance, Cyprus, and Intra EU-Trade
 5. Distance, Net Budget Balance, Cyprus, Intra-EU Trade, and Individual Variables
 6. Distance, Net Budget Balance, Cyprus, Intra-EU Trade, Individual Variables, Fear of Losing National Identity, Attachment to EU, Trust of EU, Perceptions of the Person's and Country's Voice In EU Affairs
- *=Significant at 0.05 level, two-tailed

Table 2. The Effect of Distance (Ln of Distance) on Reactions to a Hypothetical Dissolution of the European Union, controlling for Contextual and Socio-demographic and Political Culture Individual-level Variables (Multinomial Results—Contrast: Regret/Relieved)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ln (Distance)	-0.56* (0.14)	-0.61* (0.14)	-0.61* (0.15)	-0.60* (0.10)	-0.37* (0.12)	-0.52* (0.12)
Fear of Losing National Identity		-1.64* (0.13)				-1.13* (0.10)
Very Attached to EU			3.47* (0.34)			2.17* (0.26)
Attached to EU			3.02* (0.26)			2.06* (0.19)
Somewhat attached to EU			1.56* (0.21)			1.05* (0.17)
Trust in EU				3.07* (0.16)		2.38* (0.19)
Voice in EU Affairs					1.61* (0.10)	1.14* (0.09)
Country Voice in EU Affairs					1.60* (0.14)	1.06* (0.12)
Net Budget Balance	0.01* (0.1E-2)	0.01* (0.9E-3)	0.01* (0.9E-3)	0.5E-2* (0.7E-2)	0.07* (0.8E-2)	0.01* (0.6E-2)
Cyprus	1.86* (0.32)	2.05* (0.34)	2.67* (0.32)	1.88* (0.22)	1.46* (0.32)	2.43* (0.27)
Intra EU-Trade	0.07* (0.02)	0.07* (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)	0.08* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
Age	-0.08* (0.4E-2)	-0.06 (0.4E-2)	-0.01+ (0.4E-2)	-0.4E-2 (0.4E-2)	-0.01+ (0.4E-2)	-0.01 (0.4E-2)
Gender	0.14 (0.10)	0.10 (0.10)	0.21+ (0.11)	0.22+ (0.09)	0.18 (0.10)	0.25+ (0.10)
Large Town, City	0.18 (0.13)	0.13 (0.13)	0.10 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.11)	0.15 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.14)
Middle Size town	0.14 (0.12)	0.09 (0.12)	0.08 (0.12)	0.01 (0.12)	0.15 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.12)
Post-High School Education	0.29 (0.16)	0.12 (0.16)	0.17 (0.15)	0.41* (0.12)	0.33 (0.17)	0.20 (0.13)
High School Education	0.28+ (0.13)	0.22 (0.12)	0.24 (0.13)	0.24+ (0.11)	0.39* (0.13)	0.24 (0.13)
Manual Worker	-0.60* (0.10)	-0.57* (0.11)	-0.60* (0.11)	-0.59* (0.10)	-0.61* (0.12)	-0.58* (0.12)
Farmer	0.34 (0.23)	-0.19 (0.25)	-0.27 (0.27)	-0.40 (0.28)	-0.16 (0.25)	-0.16 (0.32)
Unemployed	-0.12 (0.14)	-0.15 (0.16)	-0.17 (0.15)	-0.20 (0.14)	-0.13 (0.15)	-0.27 (0.15)
Houseworker	-0.06 (0.17)	-0.02 (0.17)	-0.05 (0.18)	-0.08 (0.15)	-0.08 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.15)
Professional	0.55* (0.17)	0.48+ (0.19)	0.68* (0.18)	0.60* (0.17)	0.70* (0.16)	0.71* (0.18)
Business	-0.31 (0.28)	-0.36 (0.26)	-0.29 (0.25)	-0.27 (0.27)	-0.26 (0.27)	-0.28 (0.25)
Executive	0.69+ (0.34)	0.68 (0.36)	0.71+ (0.34)	0.60 (0.32)	0.87* (0.32)	0.92+ (0.42)
Capital city	0.02 (0.14)	0.02 (0.12)	0.12 (0.15)	0.12 (0.14)	0.17 (0.14)	0.27+ (0.13)
Trust of State Institutions	0.35* (0.03)	0.32* (0.03)	0.30* (0.03)	0.11* (0.03)	0.22* (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Knowledge of EU index	0.08+ (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.07+ (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)

(...Cont.)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Expects Improved Job Situation	0.82* (0.14)	0.74* (0.14)	0.71* (0.14)	0.56* (0.13)	0.65* (0.14)	0.38* (0.15)
Expects Same Job Situation	0.39* (0.13)	0.28+ (0.13)	0.30+ (0.12)	0.27+ (0.12)	0.34* (12)	0.13 (0.12)
Personal Improvement over Previous 5 years	0.63* (0.14)	0.57* (0.14)	0.54* (0.15)	0.58* (0.11)	0.50* (0.15)	0.37* (0.14)
No change in Personal Situation In Previous 5 years	0.57* (0.08)	0.54* (0.09)	0.51* (0.09)	0.54* (0.08)	0.51* (0.09)	0.41* (0.10)
Far Left	-0.48+ (0.23)	-0.56+ (0.24)	-0.43 (0.23)	-0.44+ (0.21)	-0.48+ (0.20)	-0.46+ (0.19)
Left	-0.02 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.15)	0.04 (0.15)	0.06 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.14)	0.02 (0.13)
Right	-0.12 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.12)	0.01 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.12)	0.02 (0.11)
Far Right	-0.24 (0.24)	-0.21 (0.23)	-0.14 (0.23)	-0.29 (0.25)	-0.37 (0.25)	-0.26 (0.24)
Discusses Politics Frequently	0.56* (0.12)	0.54* (0.12)	0.56* (0.12)	0.69* (0.13)	0.57* (0.11)	0.66* (0.13)
Discusses Politics Some	0.50* (0.08)	0.48* (0.08)	0.45* (0.08)	0.60* (0.09)	0.50* (0.08)	0.54* (0.08)
Intercept 1: Very Sorry vs Relieved	-2.67 (1.56)	-0.81 (1.42)	-3.58+ (0.160)	-1.38 (1.45)	-5.74* (1.41)	-3.23+ (1.35)
Intercept 2: Very Sorry vs Indifferent	-0.86 (1.11)	0.33 (1.05)	-1.01 (1.12)	-0.02 (0.91)	-2.22+ (1.10)	-0.44 (1.00)
McFadden	0.11	0.14	0.16	0.19	0.18	0.26
-2LL	- 11848.576	-11464.155	-11209.656	-10843.968	-10928.049	-9919.803
Df	60	62	66	62	64	74
N=13545						

*=Significant at 0.05 level, two-tailed

Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables in Statistical Analysis

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation
Distance	1011.4	621.5
Net Budget Transfers	28.7	128.9
Intra EU-Trade Share %	69.4	7.7
Age	46.1	17.3
% Male	49.3	50.0
% Middle-sized towns	37.1	48.3
% Large Town, City	28.1	45.0
% More than High School	37.6	48.4
% High School	43.1	49.5
% Manual Work	12.7	33.3
% Farmer	1.3	11.3
% Houseperson	7.0	25.6
% Professional	5.3	22.4
% Business	1.9	13.6
% Executive	1.6	12.7
% Living in Capital City Area	18.2	38.6
Trust State (1-6)	3.0	1.9
EU Knowledge (1-10)	4.8	1.9
Job Expectations (1-3)	1.9	0.6
Personal Situation 1st. 5 yrs. (1-3)	1.8	0.8
Left-Right Self-Placement (1-5)	3.6	1.4
Political Discussion (1-3)	2.0	0.6
% Fear Loss Identity	41.7	49.3
Attachment EU (1-4)	2.9	0.8
% Trust EU	61.3	48.7
% Personal Voice in EU	45.2	49.8
% Country Voice in EU	71.1	45.3

Appendix 2. The Effect of Distance (Distance Intervals) on Support of Membership in the European Union, controlling for Contextual and Socio-Demographic and Political Culture Individual-level Variables (Multinomial Results—Contrast: Good Thing/Bad Thing)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
250-500 Km	-1.08* (0.38)	-1.26* (0.38)	-1.26* (0.37)	-0.90* (0.26)	-0.93* (0.27)	-0.61* (0.23)
501-750 Km	-0.87* (0.22)	-1.08* (0.24)	-1.08* (0.24)	-0.97* (0.18)	-1.22* (0.28)	-1.03* (0.29)
751-1000 Km	-0.60 (0.38)	-1.04* (0.35)	-1.03* (0.35)	-0.99* (0.35)	-1.16* (0.43)	-1.22* (0.38)
1001-1250 Km	-0.44 (0.30)	-0.80+ (0.34)	-0.80+ (0.34)	-0.94* (0.26)	-0.82+ (0.35)	-1.07+ (0.47)
1251-1500 Km	-0.36 (0.36)	-0.94+ (0.42)	-0.93+ (0.42)	-0.94* (0.29)	-0.99* (0.33)	-1.15* (0.35)
1501-1750 Km	-0.55 (0.29)	-1.05* (0.31)	-1.05* (0.31)	-0.96* (0.19)	-1.37* (0.25)	-0.80* (0.26)
1751-2000 Km	-0.74 (0.43)	-1.53* (0.33)	-1.53* (0.34)	-1.16* (0.33)	-1.69* (0.40)	-1.38* (0.46)
2001-2250 Km	-0.72 (0.39)	-1.68* (0.33)	-1.68* (0.34)	-1.26* (0.37)	-1.82* (0.40)	-1.21* (0.40)
2251-3250 Km	-0.43 (0.23)	-0.83* (0.22)	-0.67 (0.35)	-0.37 (0.37)	-0.80 (0.52)	-0.80 (0.44)
Intercept 1: A Good Thing vs a Bad Thing	2.23* (0.17)	2.52* (0.21)	2.52* (0.21)	1.05 (1.05)	-3.60* (1.17)	-4.66* (1.06)
Intercept 2: Neither a Good nor a Bad Thing		0.79* (0.22)	0.79* (0.22)	-1.95+ (0.78)	-1.75+ (0.81)	-2.23* (0.75)
McFadden	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.11	0.26
-2LL	-12296.302	-12163.072	-12162.481	-12118.469	-11042.648	-9255.0095
Df	18	20	22	24	76	90
N=13823						

Model Description

1.Distance

2. Distance and Net Budget Balance

3. Distance, Net Budget Balance, and Cyprus

4. Distance, Net Budget Balance, Cyprus, and Intra EU-Trade

5. Distance, Net Budget Balance, Cyprus, Intra-EU Trade, and Individual Variables

6. Distance, Net Budget Balance, Cyprus, Intra-EU Trade, Individual Variables, Fear of Losing National Identity, Attachment to EU, Trust of EU, Perceptions of the Person's and Country's Voice In EU Affairs

*=Significant at 0.05 level, two-tailed


Appendix 3. The Effect of Distance (Distance Intervals) on Support of Membership in the European Union, controlling for Contextual and Socio-Demographic and Political Culture Individual-level Variables (Multinomial Results—Contrast: Good Thing/Bad Thing)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ln (Distance)	-0.56* (0.14)	-0.49* (0.12)	-0.48* (0.13)	-0.50* (0.11)	-0.26* (0.11)	-0.40* (0.12)
Fear of Losing National Identity		-1.33* (0.127)				-0.81* (0.10)
Very Attached to EU			2.86* (0.28)			1.61* (0.15)
Attached to EU			2.53* (0.21)			1.59* (0.15)
Somewhat attached to EU			1.34* (0.16)			0.86* (0.14)
Trust in EU				2.80* (0.13)		2.18* (0.16)
Voice in EU Affairs					1.37* (0.11)	0.92* (0.09)
Country Voice in EU Affairs					1.62* (0.11)	1.19* (0.08)
Net Budget Balance	0.01* (0.1E-2)	0.5E-2* (0.1E-2)	0.5E-2* (0.1E-2)	0.4E-2* (0.1E-2)	0.5E-2* (0.1E-2)	0.4E-2* (0.1E-2)
Cyprus	1.86* (0.32)	0.77* (0.27)	1.21* (0.27)	0.50* (0.19)	0.13 (0.26)	0.62* (0.22)
Intra EU-Trade	0.07* (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.04* (0.01)	0.07* (0.02)	0.04* (0.01)
Age	-0.01 (0.4E-2)	-0.01 (0.3E-2)	-0.01* (0.3E-2)	-0.6E-2 (0.3E-2)	-0.01* (0.3E-2)	-0.01* (0.3E-2)
Gender	0.14 (0.10)	0.12 (0.08)	0.22* (0.13)	0.25* (0.08)	0.20* (0.07)	0.30* (0.07)
Large Town, City	0.18 (0.13)	0.24+ (0.12)	0.22 (0.13)	0.13 (0.11)	0.29+ (0.12)	0.13 (0.13)
Middle Size town	0.14 (0.12)	0.04 (0.09)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.10 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.10)
Post-High School Education	0.29 (0.16)	0.27+ (0.13)	0.31+ (0.13)	0.55* (0.12)	0.45* (0.15)	0.40* (0.11)
High School Education	0.28+ (0.16)	0.26+ (0.12)	0.28+ (0.12)	0.27+ (0.11)	0.42* (0.12)	0.28+ (0.11)
Manual Worker	-0.60* (0.10)	-0.36* (0.09)	-0.37* (0.10)	-0.38* (0.10)	-0.40* (0.11)	-0.35* (0.11)
Farmer	-0.34 (0.23)	0.21 (0.27)	-0.29 (0.29)	-0.36 (0.27)	-0.16 (0.11)	-0.14 (0.31)
Unemployed	-0.12 (0.14)	-0.05 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.15)	-0.13 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.14)	-0.17 (0.15)
Houseworker	-0.06 (0.17)	0.08 (0.16)	0.06 (0.16)	0.04 (0.14)	0.04 (0.14)	0.05 (0.13)
Professional	0.55* (0.17)	0.29 (0.23)	0.44 (0.24)	0.36 (0.21)	0.47 (0.24)	0.43 (0.24)
Business	-0.31 (0.28)	-0.38+ (0.17)	-0.34+ (0.16)	-0.28 (0.19)	-0.28 (0.22)	-0.26 (0.20)
Executive	0.69+ (0.34)	0.69 (0.36)	0.68 (0.38)	0.62 (0.40)	0.87+ (0.37)	0.96+ (0.44)
Capital city	0.02 (0.14)	-0.09 (0.10)	-0.2E-2 (0.11)	0.6E-2 (0.11)	0.03 (0.11)	0.10 (0.11)
Trust of State Institutions	0.35* (0.03)	0.33* (0.03)	0.31* (0.03)	0.13* (0.03)	0.23* (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Knowledge of EU index	0.08+ (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)

(...Cont.)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Expects Improved Job Situation	0.82* (0.14)	0.76* (0.12)	0.74* (0.12)	0.61* (0.13)	0.66* (0.14)	0.46* (0.14)
Expects Same Job Situation	0.39* (0.13)	0.55* (0.13)	0.57* (0.13)	0.56* (0.11)	0.61* (0.12)	0.50* (0.12)
Personal Improvement over Previous 5 years	0.63* (0.57)	0.76* (0.12)	0.57* (0.14)	0.63* (0.11)	0.57* (0.13)	0.47* (0.12)
No change in Personal Situation In Previous 5 years	0.57* (0.08)	0.55* (0.13)	0.46* (0.08)	0.49* (0.08)	0.47* (0.08)	0.38* (0.09)
Far Left	-0.48+ (0.23)	-0.51+ (0.25)	-0.39 (0.23)	-0.38 (0.21)	-0.45+ (0.22)	-0.38 (0.21)
Left	-0.02 (0.15)	-0.10 (0.16)	-0.5E-2 (0.16)	0.04 (0.14)	-0.05 (0.15)	-0.4E-2 (0.15)
Right	-0.12 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.12)	0.06 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.13)	0.08 (0.12)
Far Right	-0.24 (0.24)	-0.31 (0.16)	-0.25 (0.16)	-0.38+ (0.16)	-0.48* (0.16)	-0.39+ (0.16)
Discusses Politics Frequently	0.56* (0.12)	0.20 (0.12)	0.21 (0.12)	0.30* (0.12)	0.21 (0.12)	0.23+ (0.11)
Discusses Politics Some	0.50* (0.08)	0.34* (0.07)	0.30* (0.07)	0.42* (0.07)	0.35* (0.07)	0.35* (0.06)
Intercept 1: Good Thing vs Bad Thing	-2.67 (1.56)	-0.75 (1.30)	-2.90 (1.52)	-0.83 (1.27)	-5.26* (1.26)	-2.79+ (1.32)
Intercept 2: Good Thing vs Neither Good nor a Bad Thing	-0.86 (1.11)	-1.33 (0.92)	-2.08+ (0.91)	-1.34 (0.87)	-3.05* (0.93)	-2.11+ (0.91)
McFadden	0.11	0.13	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.25
-2LL	-11104.139	-10767.169	-10598.451	-10073.419	-10213.005	-9303.437
Df	60	62	66	62	64	74
N=13823						

*=Significant at 0.05 level, two-tailed

Figure 2: Map



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